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The paper deals with the effects of migration resulting from EU Eastern enlargement on the 
welfare states of Western Europe. Although migration is good in principle, as it yields gains 
from trade and specialization for all countries involved, it does so only if it meets with 
flexible labour markets and if it is not artificially induced by gifts from the welfare state. This 
is not the present state of affairs in Western Europe. In addition to measures that make labour 
markets more flexible, the introduction of delayed integration of working migrants and the 
home country principle for non-working migrants is a rational reaction of the state. The 
proposed new EU constitution which contains far-reaching rules for a European social union 
should be amended accordingly.  
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1 May 2004 was the day on which the division of Europe into West and East  was 
finally overcome. On this day, eight Eastern European countries joined the European 
Union, as well as Malta and Cyprus. Bulgaria and Romania are waiting in line, hoping 
to join in 2007 at the latest.  
  The Eastern European countries will enter into especially close economic relations 
with Western Europe and here especially with Germany and Austria. This will yield 
gains from trade and specialization for all and it will bring internal peace and general 
prosperity to Europe. 
  But there will also be problems because of the migration processes to be expected. 
Although migration is good in principle, this is only true if it meets with flexible labour 
markets and if it is not artificially induced by gifts  of the welfare state. This is the topic 
of this contribution. It deals with the policies in the Western European countries and in 
the EU itself that must be pursued in order to let  market forces unfold  thereby 
providing Europe with a maximum of welfare and social security and maintain it in 
view of the expected migration. In this context, the new EU constitution, which contains 
far-reaching rules for a European social union, will be of central importance. 
 
Migration, wage differences and Eastern enlargement  
Eastern enlargement of the European Union will create substantial pressures for 
migration, as wage differences are still immense at present, as shown in Figure 1. In 
2003, the average labour cost per hour in the accession countries was only 14% or one 
seventh of the west German labour cost per hour. Of course, due to the Balassa-
Samuelson effect, the purchasing power parity differences are significantly smaller: the 2 
lower wages in the eastern European countries translate into lower prices for non-traded 
goods. However, even the differences in real wages are huge, in particular for migrant 
workers who save at least part of their earnings for future expenditure at home or who 





























1) Average labor costs in industry.
Source: For the accession countries, the Eurostat figures for 2000 were extrapolated on
the basis to the Eurostat press release no. 112 of September 15, 2004 or the ILO data 













  Bulgaria and Romania are not among  the present accession countries, but the wage 
ifferences that exist vis-à-vis the other countries may also give rise to massive 
locations of plants and migration pressures that will only be kept from exploding by 
dministrative restrictions during the initial seven years. In 2010, when the transition 
eriod will have ended and  free movement of labour will prevail, there will still be 
great wage differences despite a certain convergence. To date, the convergence has been 
1.1% p. a. in Western Europe, and empirically the maximum for very rapid adjustment 
processes is considered to be 2% p. a., as a rule of thumb.
1 At a maximum convergence 
rate of 2% p.a., wages of the accession countries will still amount to only 25% of west 
German wages in 2010 and 38% in 2020. 
  In an econometric study commissioned by the German Ministry of Labour, the Ifo 
Institute projected that about 4% to 5% of the population of the countries joining the EU 
in 2004 will immigrate into the old EU countries within the next 15 years if immigration 
is not restricted. How large it will be with restrictions cannot be projected as the kind 
and the extent of the restrictions are not yet known. Lower figures are projected by 
Boeri and Brücker (2002) in a study commissioned by the EU, but this study inferred 
from the lack of reaction of migration to cyclical shocks that there will be little reaction 
to long-term wage differences, as criticised by Sinn and Werding (2001). 
  As proof of only little migration pressure, some have pointed to the immigration from 
Spain and Portugal, comparing Eastern EU enlargement to  Southern EU enlargement. 
As migration to Germany was small at that time, a large movement of people from 
Eastern Europe is also not held to be likely. 






1   See Sinn/Ochel (2003).  4 
  The comparison is inappropriate, however. Firstly, income differences were much 
smaller in the Southern enlargement. At that time, the average wage income of   
Spaniards and Portuguese was close to 50% of west German wage income.
2 This is 
quite different from  the 15% of west German wages prevailing currently in the 
accession countries. Secondly, at that time, migration had already occurred before EU 
accession, whereas there has only been relatively little immigration from Eastern 
Europe to date, not accounting for the Eastern Europeans who, with nothing but a tourist 
visa, are working in the German underground economy. Those who have already 
emigrated, cannot emigrate once more after EU accession. This trivial fact should not be 
overlooked when searching for parallels.
3  
  In the period from 1960 to 1974/75, until the end of the Franco and Salazar 
dictatorships, there had already been mass emigration from Spain and Portugal. 
Although both countries had also been experiencing particularly high immigration from 
their former colonies at that time, net emigration of the Iberian population had already 
amounted to 5.5% p.a. during that period. 
  The possibility of emigration distinguished the dictatorships on the Iberian Peninsula 
from those in Eastern Europe. Whereas Franco and Salazar had allowed the free 
movement of people, the Soviet Union had closed off its territory with an Iron Curtain, 
                                           
which only very few surmounted at the risk of life and limb. When the Iron Curtain 
came down in 1989, many East Europeans did come West, and especially to Germany, 
but the West Europeans immediately replaced the Iron Curtain with a legal curtain by 
 
2   See Sinn (2002, p. 107).   
3   See Sinn et al. (2001).  5 
tightening their immigration and asylum laws. That is why the migration pressures from 
Eastern Europe continue unabatedly.  
 
Why migration is good in principle  
The West should not be afraid of migration, even if migration pressures are large. In 
principle, that is when labour markets are functioning and without distorting 
interventions of the state, it may be expected that the free movement of people is 
advantageous for Europe and all countries involved. This statement is true 
independently of whether the volume of migration is small or large. What immigrants 
can earn in Western Europe by far exceeds the loss of output at home caused by their 
grant himself. If they exceeded the wage 
Eastern enlargement of the EU. This concerns all those occupational groups that offer 
similar services on the labour market as the immigrants. In contrast, owners of capital 
ell as skilled wage and salary earners who are not subject to the 
emigration, and what they earn in the West is normally less than their output. Only the 
last immigrant receives a wage that equals his contribution to national output. 
Intramarginal immigrants receive less. Therefore both sides stand to gain. This is still 
true if the subjective and objective costs of migration are taken into account, because 
these costs are considered by the immi
advantage there would be no migration. 
  Of course, wages will change as a result of migration. In the country of origin they 
will rise because labour is getting scarcer, and in Western Europe they will fall as the 
supply of labour increases. They must fall because otherwise the firms would not be 
interested in providing the additional jobs needed by the immigrants.  
  Because of the change in wages there will also be losers in the West as the result of 
and of real estate as w6 
pressures of competition will belong to the winners, as demand rises for the factors of 
production they offer and they therefore benefit from higher prices and wages. In sum, 
e Western Europeans will gain from immigration, but only because the winners win 
oduces just as much value added as he costs. In 
al European GDP 
th
more than the losers lose.  
  The reduction in wage differences between the country of origin and the country of 
destination is a necessary regulatory mechanism of the migration process, just as wages 
in general have a signalling and allocation function in a market economy. The shrinking 
wage differences will slow down the increase in the movement of people and will bring 
it to a halt at a point at which the wage difference is equal to the last immigrant’s costs 
of migration. This immigrant is almost indifferent regarding his decision to migrate, and 
people with higher migration costs will prefer to stay at home. The equilibrating process 
will be supported by declining rents abroad and rising rents at home which both tend to 
reduce the gap in real wages.  
  At each point of time, the working population is optimally distributed between the 
countries involved. In Western Europe as well as in the country of origin, the firms will 
employ people until the last employee pr
each country real wages will therefore equal the real marginal value product of the 
workers, and the wage difference measures also the addition to total European output 
resulting from the migration of one additional worker. Since the real wage difference 
just equals the migration cost of the last migrant, the addition to tot
resulting from his migration is also just equal to these costs. The sum of the national 
products of both countries minus the migration costs of all those involved can no longer 
be changed by a bit more or less migration than the market would generate itself. This 
sum is maximized by the “invisible hand” of the market. Even a wise and all-knowing 7 
central planner, if such a person did exist, could not find an economically more efficient 
distribution of the working population between the two countries. 
  The distribution of the working population between West and East will not remain 
constant over time. Rather, because of the low wages in the countries of origin, there 
 the Greeks, too, are gradually returning home.  
will be a continuous capital inflow into these countries that raises the productivity of 
labour there and induces the firms to demand more labour. Over the course of time this 
will result in further wage increases. Conversely, the capital outflow from Western 
Europe will result in wage reductions there, albeit perhaps only to reductions relative to 
the growth trend of wages. This will slow the flow of immigrants, and many of the 
foreigners who have come to Western Europe will decide to return to their home 
countries. Such a two-way migration flow has also been observed in past migration 
processes. Thus, most of the Italians who immigrated to Germany in the 1960s have 
meantime returned to Italy, and
  This favourable picture of the migration process is only true in principle, however, 
i.e. under the assumption of free markets and without any possibly distorting influences 
of the welfare state. In reality, the immigration to Western Europe during the past 30 
years looked quite different, and that is the topic of the next two sections. 
 
Immigration into unemployment 
The major prerequisite for welfare raising effects of migration is wage flexibility. Only 
if wages decline of those occupational groups to which the immigration occurs, will 
employers be willing to create new jobs for the immigrating people. Only in that case 
will there be additional output in the country of immigration and only in that case will it 
be possible for this additional output to more than offset the reduction in output in the 8 
home country, including the costs of migration, making migration economically 
worthwhile. 
  Countries like Israel or the United States, whose labour markets have been able to 
absorb large numbers of immigrants, are characterized by such a flexibility of wages. In 
Israel, the unemployment rate even declined from 9.6% to 8.8% between 1990 and 
2000, although the population grew by one quarter during this period. In the United 
States, population growth by immigration amounted to 19.3% or close to 40 million 
people from 1970 to 2000. Yet the unemployment rate fell from 5.0% in 1970 to 4.0% 
in 2000.
4 None of the two countries experienced any particular problems of integration 
due to immigration, and both succeeded in translating immigration into a growth surge. 
If the labour market is left alone, immigration is no problem but rather is of great 
advantage to the economy. 
  The countries of Western Europe, however, do not leave their labour markets alone. 
revent domestic workers, who are facing competition from immigration, from being 
                                           
There is no wage flexibility of the American or Israeli type. The reason is the welfare 
state which offers attractive income opportunities for those who do not find a job by 
paying so-called replacement incomes like unemployment benefits, early retirement 
benefits and in particular social aid. The wage replacement benefits of the welfare state 
p
willing to accept lower wages.  
 
migration: US Bureau of the Census, Annual Geographical Mobility Rates by Type of Movement, 1947 
Israel, Selected Data, Population, see http://www.cbs.gov.il/engindex.htm.  
4   US  population:  Economic Report of the President 2003, see http://w3.access.gpo.gov/eop/; US 
– 2001, see http:/www.census.gov/; unemployment in Israel: Bank of Israel, Annual Report 1999, 
Statistical Appendix, see http://www.bankisrael.gov.il/; Israeli population: Central Bureau of Statistics 
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  Bounded from below by replacement incomes, West European wages of low-skilled 
workers follow a relatively rigid trend that obeys the wishes of the unions and the 
ving held a job. No, most immigrants took regular jobs, and 
amounted to 7.5 million people, including of course also 
non wage earners. Of these, about 3.1 million people work in the official labour market. 
This is roughly the increase in the number of domestic unemployed in the same period 
po
migrants. 
welfare politicians’ ideas of equity instead of the dictates of the market. That is why the 
additional supply pressure of the immigrants does not lead to wage moderation. And 
because wages do not fall against the trend, no additional jobs are created. There is 
immigration into unemployment. 
  This is, by and large, the process that occurred in many West European countries, 
especially in Germany. It did not imply that all immigrants immediately and exclusively 
became unemployed themselves, i.e. that there was direct immigration into the arms of 
the welfare state. That would not have been possible for the sole reason that foreigners 
were not directly entitled to welfare benefits like unemployment assistance or social 
assistance, but only after ha
nationals became unemployed instead. The revolving door of the labour market turns 
quickly. The immigrants succeeded in occupying many places in the revolving door that 
were then unavailable to the domestic workers. 
  A closer look at German conditions can illuminate the facts. From 1970, when for all 
practical purposes there still was no unemployment, until 2002, unemployment among 
the domestic population and the immigrants rose by 3.9 million people. During this 
period of time, net immigration 
of time which was about 3.2 million. The additional unemployment among the domestic 
pulation during the past 30 years may essentially be explained by crowding out by 
im10 
  Immigration into unemployment is entirely pointless from an economic point of 
view, because the immigrants are no longer available for production in their home 
country, and in the host country there is no additional output because jobs are only 
exchanged. The combined national product of the countries involved is smaller than it 
would have been and, in addition, there are still the costs of migration. 
  The developments in the German labour market are due to the logic of the wage 
nals will be displaced to the 
etermined by those suppliers in the market who have the highest costs and 
replacement system and follow a very basic economic chain of effects. The wage 
replacement system of the welfare state itself is responsible for unemployment because 
it sets a minimum wage entitlement that a private employer has to meet in order for 
employment to pay for the worker. If this minimum wage entitlement exceeds the 
productivity of the jobs that would have to be created for full employment to exist, 
unemployment will result. If in this situation immigrants enter the labour market, who 
are willing to work at lower wages than the local wage earners because they are not or 
not fully eligible for wage replacement benefits until they will have worked long 
enough in Germany, then they will get the jobs and the natio
extent that immigrants are available.  
  But there are no additional jobs because the immigrants will crowd  only a fraction of 
the national labour force. The buffer for the decision whether to hire more or fewer 
people will only consist of the local unemployed who receive wage replacement 
benefits and therefore have high wage demands. This is not contradicted by the fact that 
over time the immigrants will also be eligible for wage replacement benefits, will also 
develop high wage demands and will themselves be pushed into unemployment. 
  One of the basic principles of the market economy is that the price and volume sold 
will only be d11 
therefore demand the highest prices. If more low-cost suppliers enter the market, prices 
will decline and the quantity rise only if they have enough capacity to completely 
replace the high-cost suppliers. The same applies to the labour market. Those receiving 
wage replacement benefits from the welfare state are the high-cost suppliers in the sense 
that they stand to lose a lot by taking up a job and therefore have high wage demands. If 
result. It derives from the redistribution 
ctivity 
lower-cost suppliers enter the labour market, this will also have no effect on the volume 
of employment or the general wage level, but will result in the replacement of the high-
cost suppliers by the immigrants who will offer minimally lower wages or other small 
concessions in other areas of working conditions. Only after complete displacement 
would wages start declining and would it pay the firms to create additional jobs, but this 
case is not realistic for the labour market in view of the orders of magnitude involved.
5  
 
The welfare state as an immigration magnet 
Even if measures were taken to make the labour market more flexible and to permit 
immigration into new jobs rather than into unemployment, a second problem would 
stand in the way of an optimal migration 
activity of the welfare state. Since it is in the nature of the welfare state to take from the 
rich and give to the poor, immigration induced by wage differences is distorted. Skilled 
workers who would earn an above-average labour income in Western Europe must pay 
something like an entrance fee, whereas less skilled workers who would earn a below-
average income in the West receive a kind of migration premium that increases the 
incentive to immigrate beyond what can be explained by wage and produ
                                            
government set replacement incomes. 
5    See Sinn (2004) for a formal treatment of this phenomenon in an explicit migration model with 12 
differences. For these reasons, the welfare state works like a two-pole magnet for the 
people who are willing to migrate. With one side it repels the rich net payers and with 
the other it pulls in the poor who rely on the state. 
  This redistribution occurs not only and not even essentially as a result of the 
instruments of social security, but primarily via regular budget items. The state levies 
taxes that rise in line with income, but it spends its funds more or less uniformly on 
everyone. Redistribution even occurs through the free availability of roads and bridges, 
of parks and public offices, of judges and policemen or of schools and universities. 
Everybody can avail himself of these services, but some pay more for them than others.  
  To date, the immigrants have been predominantly unskilled, or at least people who 
could only earn a below-average income in Germany. For one, this is in the nature of 
ings as immigrants usually lack language skills. Then, too, it results from the forces of 
tivities of the state. Because of their low 
                                           
th
selection developed by the redistribution ac
income, the unskilled immigrants received, in addition to their value added, the 
redistribution gains of the state as a migration premium. Although they and their 
employers paid their taxes and social security contributions, they received more from 
the state than they had paid, and this effect was the stronger the lower the immigrants’ 
skills and thus the lower their wages. The immigration magnet demonstrated its effects.
6  
  Migration of these people would also have resulted in a welfare loss if there had 
never been the problem of immigration into unemployment. The very last immigrant, 
who is still coming but is almost indifferent, is a person whose migration causes a 
welfare loss equal to the redistribution gain. This person bears migration costs in excess 
 
 
6   See Borjas (1999).  13 
of the increase in his wage and hence in his value added by being integrated into the 
more productive economy but equal to the redistribution gain. The funds this person 
receives do not raise his standard of living compared to having remained home, but the 
tax payers lose them entirely. 
  The question arises as to the actual size of the gifts presented by the state to the 
immigrants. In an extensive study based on the socio-economic panel, the Ifo Institute 
tried to estimate the flows of state benefits to the stock of immigrants in Germany in 
1997. Account was taken of taxes, contributions, pensions, welfare benefits as well as 
all the indirect benefits from public goods. Public goods include, for example, roads, 
bridges, parks, environmental protection, the courts, the administration, the police, fire 
fighters and the like. The findings of the study are presented in Table 1 
  Most public goods are impure public goods with congestion externalities. The utility 
of using roads, parks or the services of the police and the courts falls the more, the more 
users there are. Assuming that the jurisdictions providing the public goods operate at 
their optimal scale, it follows from the theorem of Mohring and Harwitz (1962) that the 
average cost of providing the public goods equals the marginal social congestion cost. 
Thus, the cost estimates given in the table can be interpreted as externalities the 
immigrants impose on the domestic population.  14 
The fiscal externality of a migrant to Germany 
In euros   Length of stay (years) 
per immigrant und year  0 − 10  10 − 25  25 +  
Balance of state revenues / expenditures     
Health insurance  -590  -43  49 
Pension insurance without child effect  1.376  1.606  2.148 
Nursing insurance  95  117  176 
Unemployment insurance  127  217  -519 
Taxes and tax-financed benefits  -3.375  -3.227  -1.001 
Total balance  -2.367  -1.330  853 
Full child effect on pensions   1.126  1.314  1.757 
Total balance with full child effect  -1.241  -16  2.610 
 
immigrants in west Germany was  surveyed in 1997; it consists of those persons of non-German 
citizenship who live in west Germany, naturalized persons and persons with mothers of non-Germany 
* Cash value of payments made and received excluding any child effects. 
Source: Sinn et al. (2001); Sozioökonomisches Panel (SOEP). 
Legend: Using the socio-economic panel (6,810 surveyed households in Germany) the stock of 




  The table shows that immigrants paid less into health insurance than they received 
from the state, but made high net payments into the pension insurance system, because 
the discounted value of their payments exceeded the pension claims established. 
Unemployment insurance profited from those immigrants who had lived in Germany for 
less than 25 years and lost from those immigrants who had been in Germany longer than 
this. As the latter were not very numerous, unemployment insurance gained on balance. 
But the immigrants paid less in taxes than they received in the form of tax-financed 
welfare benefits and public infrastructure services. In these areas the state experienced a 
big deficit. 
Table 1  15 
  Immigrants w uld realize, on 
 a net gain from redistribution of annually 2,3 his net gain 
mium. 
to the way the  n system  
 Thum’s (2000) estimates for the German ion syste was 
axes immigrants to   
migrants will receive pensions whose present value is 45% of 
hat they contributed to the pension system (while Germans receive about 50%).  
 earlier draft of this paper that the 
ance could also take into account the implicit taxes paid by the children of 
immigrants. Indeed, as I argued and proved elsewhere (Sinn 1990, 1997), the net fiscal 
externality of permanent immigrants who bring a whole dynasty of descendants into the 
country, equals the present value of the gross contributions of the first generation to the 
pension system. The basic reason is that the immigrants’ pension will be financed by the 
children of the immigrants themselves. Razin and Sadka (1999) independently also 
showed this in paper that was based on a 1998 IMF working paper.  
  The last two lines of the table capture this effect by assuming that all immigrants will 
leave their descendants in the pension system. In that case, there is an additional benefit 
to the pension system of 1,126 euros per immigrant. This effect reduces the absolute 
value of the negative net fiscal externality, but does not change its sign for the group of 
immigrants who stay for less than ten years. The negative net fiscal externality in 
Germany is 1,241 euros per person and year in this case.  
ho had been in Germany for less than ten years co
balance, 67 euros per head. T
can be interpreted as a migration pre
  The calculations are sensitive  pensio  is modelled. Following
von Weizsäcker’s and  pens m, it 
assumed that the implicit t Germany pay are  55% of their gross
contributions, i.e. that im
w
 
The Effect of Immigrants’ Children  
Razin and Sadka (2004) correctly commented on an
fiscal bal16 
  If the immigrants stay longer, they will also succeed in integrating themselves better 
into working life. Occupational skills and language proficiency will improve, and wages 
will rise in line with productivity. At higher wages, they will have to pay higher taxes, 
euros 
hich is smaller than any reasonable error margin. On average, during the whole period 
years, even these migrants’ fiscal externality was 
nd only about 15% 
and the redistribution gain of the state will become bigger. Migrants, who resided in 
Germany for less than 25 years but for more than ten years, received during that period 
of their stay, on balance, only 1,331 euros per year from the state if their children re-
migrated with them, and with a full child effect they received about as much as they and 
their descendants contributed: the net fiscal balance in this case was only –16 
w
of their stay, including the first ten 
negative significantly negative despite a full child effect. Migrants, who had resided in 
Germany for more than 25 years, made net payments to the state of 853 euros per year 
during that period of their stay without the child effect and 2,610 euros with the full 
child effect.  
  Unfortunately, as a rule, the immigrants did not stay long enough in Germany to 
become net payers. European guest worker migration typically is a return migration, 
unlike the permanent immigration of dynasties into the United States or Israel. About 
60% of the immigrants surveyed had returned home after ten years, a
of them participated in the official labour market. After 25 years more than 80% had 
either died or had returned to their home country. While no information on the destiny 
of the immigrants’ children  is available, it seems very plausible that the vast majority of 
immigrants who return home within a decade are not leaving their offspring in 
Germany.  17 
  Apart from that, the children of immigrants who stay in the country have a hard time 
reaching average incomes during their subsequent working years. Typically, the second 
generation of immigrants remain below-average wage earners and therefore also impose 
a burden on the redistributive state. 
  Overall, there can be little doubt that immigration involves quite substantial fiscal 
losses for the welfare state, notwithstanding the gains from trade effects immigration is 
bringing about. This is a fortiori true if account is taken of the fact that the cost of the 
unemployed, who were crowded out of their jobs by immigrants because the welfare 
state offers them attractive replacement incomes, has not been included in the above 
figures. If this cost had been added, the figures would be very much higher.  
  To date, the direct losses of the state due to the redistribution gains received by the 
immigrants have been bearable. However, at least in Germany the cost of 
unemployment has been enormous and has largely contributed to the country’s financial 
difficulties and ensuing benefit cuts. This situation could be exacerbated by a rise in the 
ountries will enter a form of competition for deterrence vis-à-vis the 
economic refugees from Eastern Europe and other parts of the world. People willing to 
number of immigrants after the doors are opened to east Europeans which will be the 
case from 2011 onwards, at the latest, when the transition period for labour market 
integration ends. Other countries could then face similar difficulties and be forced to cut 
their benefits.  
 
 
Welfare states’ competition for deterrence 
A reduction of welfare benefits is to be expected for the particular reason that the West 
European c18 
emigrate from Eastern Europe will compare potential countries of destination and will 
focus on those with the best welfare systems. To be sure, the decision to emigrate is a 
serious personal decision with many non-economic elements, but the choice of where to 
go, once the decision to leave one’s home country has been made, will depend in large 
rrence will 
ocesses. The states’ reactions frequently take many years. But they are 
d by powerful forces that could, in the long term, significantly change the face of the 
elfare state of Western European character. Germany is presently thinking about 
er countries already did that in the past, 
measure on the economic conditions in the potential countries of destination. 
  In this situation, each potential country of destination is well advised to think about 
the welfare benefits it wants to offer. If it is too generous it will attract the “boarders” of 
the state and may have to expect substantial expenditures. Therefore each country may 
tend to try being stingier than its neighbours. If, however, all Western European 
countries try to be stingier than their neighbours, this competition for dete
lead to a gradual erosion of the welfare state.
7  
  This must be expected especially if migration is strengthened by network effects, that 
is, if it must be assumed that the initial immigrants from a certain country will be 
followed by their compatriots. The fear of network effects forces the welfare states in 
particular measure to beware of giving gifts to the migrants. What starts out as little 
gifts that can be financed may become financial burdens later on that are no longer 
bearable without a large-scale cutback of general welfare benefits.




reducing its excessive welfare expenditures. Oth
and again others will follow. The competition for deterrence has already begun. 
                                            
8   See Thum (2000).  
7   See Sinn (2003), and the references mentioned there.  19 
  It is possible that in these respects Europe will also gradually move in the direction of 
the United States that has no welfare state. The reason is not that Americans do not want 
one, rather that it could not survive the mobility of the people. In 1968, under Mayor 
Lindsey, New York City had tried to introduce more generous welfare rules along the 
European pattern, in order to get the poor off the streets. As a consequence, the poor 
to introduce a welfare state in the United 
  The first way would not be meaningful. It would not conform to the Treaty of 
event the welfare gains of migration as described above. The second 
from all over the country soon came to New York City and drove it to near bankruptcy. 
At least, in 1975, the banks refused to extend additional credit to the City. This forced 
the politicians to retract and return to the harsh welfare rules that exist in the entire 
country to this day. Washington, D.C. had similar experiences when it had to cut back 
its initially generous welfare programmes because the costs caused by the inflow of 
poor people spiralled of control. The only way 
States would be via actions of the federal government, but for such actions the 
necessary majority cannot be found. Individual states that want to introduce higher 
benefits cannot succeed if they act in a competitive fashion, without the co-ordination 
with others.  
  There are basically only three ways to prevent Europe from having to face similar 
developments. 
1.  The free movement of EU citizens is prohibited.  
2.  Immigrants are not or not immediately integrated into the welfare system of the 
country of destination.  
3.  The welfare systems are harmonized, preventing erosion by competition. 
 
Rome and would pr20 
was proposed by the Scientific Advisory Council attached to the German Ministry of 
Finance. This is a point to be dealt with later. The last way seems to be the solution 
being approached by the new EU constitution, whose draft was recently presented by 
the EU Constitutional Convention. This topic is so important for the future of Europe 




The new EU constitution: Twenty mezzogiorni in Europe 
The Constitutional Convention, chaired by Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, the former French 
President, presented its proposal for the new EU constitution in June 2003, and with 
small amendments it was accepted in June 2004 at the Intergovernmental Conference in 
Brussels.  This proposal is to be presented to the parliaments of the EU countries for 
ratification. Some countries have announced that they will also hold a referendum.  
  The new EU constitution defines the basic rights of the citizens of the Union, the 
ountries and much more. Above all, it safeguards the economic and 
cur e right to private property and 
the 
  Ther er, that the constitution is unambiguously directed at the 
goa ders a 
uropean social union in many articles that deal with social coherence, solidarity, the 
decision-making bodies, the division of responsibilities among the European Union and 
the individual c
rency union among the Member States, as well as th
right of free movement so essential for a market economy.  
e is the problem, howev
l of creating a European social union. The constitutional proposal consi
E
fight against poverty, and similar things. Of particular importance are the following 
statements: 21 
 
Article I-4, Fundamental freedoms and non-discrimination  
any discrimination on grounds of nationality shall be prohibited.  
Article I-8, Citizenship of the Union:  
additional to a national citizenship; it shall not replace
 
(2) In the field of application of the Constitution, and without prejudice to any of its specific provisions, 
 
(1) Every national of a Member State shall be a citizen of the Union. Citizenship of the Union shall be 
 it 
) Citizens of the Union shall enjoy the rights and be subject to the duties provided for in the 
onstitution. They shall have the right to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member 
States; ...  
Article II-34, Social security and social assistance  
) The Union recognizes and respects the entitlement to social security benefits and social services 
providing protection in cases such as maternity, illness, industrial accidents, dependency or old age, and 
own by Union law and national laws 
and practices. 
and social advantages in accordance with Union law and national laws and pratices.   
(3) In order to combat social exclusion and poverty, the Union recognises and respects the right to social 
free 
rity benefits and social 





in the case of loss of employment, in accordance with the rules laid d
 
(2) Everyone residing and moving legally within the European Union is entitled to social security benefits 
 
and housing assistance so as to ensure a decent existence for all those who lack sufficient resources, in 
accordance with the rules laid down by Union law and national laws and practices.  
 
  These articles do not sound implausible at first reading. Union citizenship and 
choice of residency are essential steps for a united Europe, and who would want to 
discriminate against citizens of other EU countries? The connection between the 
prohibition of discrimination and Article II-34 may have dire consequences, however. 
The constitution seems to say that a citizen of the Union may reside where he wants and 
that he is then entitled to the host country’s full social secu
advantages. And he must not be treated any differently from the nationals. The right to 
inclusion in the welfare state applies; so, in any case, says the legal jargon.  
   Although the above mentioned rights have already been granted before in Europe, by 
raising them to the level of constitutional rights they strengthen the idea of social 
inclusion. Un22 
deterrence à la United States, as described in the previous section. They truly create the 
 rules that are to strengthen 
voke economic reactions of the 
tates.  
itizens will be further expanded by the 
pplied to employed people. Those who change the country for reasons other than to 
xclusion applies. 
ast not explicitly. According to Article II-34, each EU citizen who resides legally in a 
country, and not only economically active people, is entitled to social security and 
implemented into national laws by June 2006, gives non-employed the right to migrate 
ever, these 
command enough resources to live on.  The full protection of the welfare state is then 
ideal conditions for a full unfolding of this competition. The
the welfare state really weaken it because they pro
advantaged citizens and the burdened s
  Presumably, the rights of inclusion of EU c
new constitution compared to today’s laws. To date, these rights have essentially 
a
take up work elsewhere, for example as tourists, as pensioners or as students, are given 
the cold shoulder by the host country’s welfare state. They are not entitled to pensions, 
unemployment compensation or social assistance. A rather stringent principle of 
e
  Limiting inclusion to employed people is no longer part of the new constitution, at 
le
social advantages like those granted to nationals.  
  It is true that the inclusion of non-employed persons remains limited despite the new 
constitution because its general provisions are being restricted by various EU 
Directives. The new Directive on Free Migration of May 2004, which will have to be 
wherever they want but requires that they have health insurance coverage and sufficient 
resources so as not to need welfare benefits in the host country. How
requirements are limited to a period of five years. Thereafter, the migrants have the 
permanent right of residence even if they have no insurance coverage and do not 23 
available. In this sense, there is now also the right of direct immigration of non-
employed people into the welfare state, following the spirit of the new constitution. 
Interestingly enough, this right is not subject to the constraints on labour migration from 
Eastern Europe imposed during the transition period that lasts until 2010.   
my of the host country. Black market work, too, will again earn him 
growing burdens on Europe’s welfare 
  There will be an incentive for East European migrants to exchange their jobs back 
home for social assistance for themselves and their families after having lived in a 
western European EU country for five years. German social assistance, for example, is 
two to four times the Polish net wage depending on family status. Even if the gain 
comes only after five years of residence, it will be enough to enable the migrant to build 
a solid house back home, especially if he can use his time for a lucrative job in the 
underground econo
three to four times the wage at home. 
  There is still some ambiguity as to the how the national governments will implement 
the new EU directive in detail. However, there can be little doubt that the migration 
decisions of job seekers will be distorted and that 
states will result. Eastern enlargement has increased a problem from which the West 
European welfare states have suffered for at least two decades. It is therefore more than 
likely that over the course of the next few decades the competition for deterrence will 
intensify and the benefits of the welfare states will continue to be reduced. 
  Under these conditions it is foreseeable that  voices for a harmonization of the 
welfare rules in Europe will become louder, voices that are already to be heard from the 
social policy makers in all countries, who demand a social union for Europe in addition 
to economic and currency union. Such a harmonization would be in agreement with 24 
Article I-14 (4) of the constitutional draft that explicitly provides for initiatives of the 
EU to coordinate the social policies of the member states.  
  Germany has already experienced the meaning of a social union with an extremely 
poor country, and the Italians, too, have experienced some of this. A social union 
 by the social union. 
implies uniform wage replacement incomes and thus uniform minimum wage demands 
in all parts of the European economy. In the economically weaker areas these minimum 
wage demands push the actual wages above the level that is compatible with full 
employment. Unemployment is the consequence. Unemployment compensation must 
then be paid by the richer regions via corresponding transfers. Germany’s experiences 
with eastern Germany, and Italy’s experiences with the Mezzogiorno, its southern 
regions, speak volumes. Neither country has so far found a solution to the permanent 





















Source: OECD 2002; Taxing Wages 2000 – 2001, Eurostat.
1) Blue colour worker, married, two children. 2) Family with 2 children.
Net Wage Income in Europe Compared to West German Social Aid (2000)









  The substantial problems already experienced by Germany and Italy could become a 
chronic disease of Europe as a whole. The reason may be easily recognized in Figure 2 
on: Delayed integration into the welfare system and home country principle 
In order to prevent the described risks two measures are conceivable. First, the system 
of wage replacement incomes could largely be abolished, and a system of wage 
supplements or wage subsidies along the lines of the American “earned income tax 
credit” could be introduced instead. Wage subsidies are no lower bounds on wages, but 
nevertheless help to maintain the incomes of the poor. They make wages flexible and 
prevent immigration into unemployment. Explicit proposals for Germany along these 
lines have been developed by the Ifo Institute, for example.
9  
  Second, the inclusion of immigrants in the welfare state could be limited. The 
Scientific Advisory Council attached to the German Finance Ministry and similarly the 
that compares net wages of various countries and regions with the west German level of 
social assistance. Harmonization of social assistance at a level that Germany still 
considers appropriate would be the economic death knell of entire regions and countries 
in Europe. This would not only affect Eastern Europe. Many regions in the old EU 
would also be unable to pay the wages that would keep step with a harmonized social 
standard at the German level. There would not be two but twenty Mezzogiorni in 
Europe. Like the two existing ones, these twenty Mezzogiorni would have to be kept 
afloat by the funds of the still functioning regions. The current EU budget would 
multiply, and the EU would begin to become a serious financial problem for the 
Member States.  
 
The soluti26 
Ifo Institute have recommended to place immigrant workers under the full protection of 
the social system only after some delay. During the period of delay, some tax financed 
social benefits should be curtailed so as to completely balance the fiscal current 
account.
10 The motto would be that each EU citizen who wants to come is welcome, but 
does not receive any gifts. 
  The foreign worker is fully liable to taxes and contributions and he receives all 
entitlements to contribution-financed benefits as he does today, but tax-financed 
benefits are initially not granted to the full extent. Most state services like free access to 
the public infrastructure and legal protection by the police and the courts would be 
available in full. But some benefits would be limited, like housing allowances, social 
assistance, child allowances for children remaining abroad or the availability of social 
housing. The limitations should be tailored in such a way that the fiscal account of the 
ate is balanced. In the table above, there should thus no longer be a deficit of close to 
o 
cess of migration to the 
                                                                                                                               
st
2,400 euros for the annual net cost of the state during the initial ten years, but a zer
balance. 
  In addition, non-employed people should not be included in the social system of the 
host country but continue to demand support from their home countries. They could 
migrate wherever they want within the EU, but once they become needy without having 
worked there, they should be supported by their countries of origin.  
  Delayed integration of employed migrants combined with a home country principle 
for non-employed migrants would reduce the expected ex
 
10  See Scientific Advisory Council attached to the Ministry of Finance (2001), and Sinn et al. (2001).  
 
9   See Sinn, Holzner, Meister, Ochel, Werding-(2003).  27 
economically efficient extent because migration premia would no longer be paid. 
Beyond that, it would take the pressure off the welfare states to meet the fiscal 
implications of migration with a general and undifferentiated reduction of redistributive 
payments. It would prevent the erosion of the welfare states caught in a competition for 
deterrence, and it would therefore also prevent the harmonization of social systems. 
working there is, in principle, entitled to social security benefits and social advantages 
limit tax-financed benefits. Non-employed persons must direct claims for social 
 
rinciple and the principle of delayed integration. 
fy the constitution 
characterize the current legal status of the EU. However, it itself does not seem to feel 
tion into the Western European welfare 
tates after Eastern enlargement. That is why it came up with the solution to give 
Europe would not develop twenty Mezzogiorni, but would prosper in the economic 
differentiation that exists and, driven by the economic processes described above, would 
gradually converge, driven by the economic forces of factor price equalization.  
  In order for this development to happen, Article II-34 (2) of the draft for the EU 
Constitution could read: 
Every person migrating legally from one EU country to another for the purpose of 
of the host country. However, during an initial waiting period the host country may 
assistance at their home countries, regardless of the their country of residence. 
This would be sufficient, at least at the constitutional level, to establish the home 
country p
 Of  course, the political chances for such a modification of the constitution are slim. 
However, European parliaments should know what they vote for if they ratify the 
constitution in its present form. Should there be opposition to the constitution by one 
country there would be a chance to reconsider the case and modi
before a second ratification round is begun.  
  The EU firmly holds on to a confirmation of the social inclusion rules that 
overly comfortable with the idea of free migra
s28 
countries the right to suspend the free movement of accession country workers during a 
transition period of up to seven years after Eastern enlargement and to permit national 
restrictions for this period of time.
11 This is similar to the procedure during Southern 
enlargement, where the restrictions were removed early on, however, because the 
migration pressure was much less than expected. As was explained above, the pressure 
there had already been reduced before EU accession by the mass emigration during the 
time of dictatorship. In the case of Eastern Europe the situation is quite different 
because there was an Iron Curtain and because wages relative to those in the old EU 
fter the 
 home country principle, in 
w, quantitative restrictions are an inexact 
countries are only a third of what they were in Spain and Portugal at the time of 
accession.  
  The EU Commission’s proposal is not convincing for two reasons. Firstly, it only 
offers a temporary chance to influence the migration flows. The transition period after 
EU accession of the East European countries will pass quickly, and even therea
West European welfare state will maintain its function of immigration magnet for 
unskilled Eastern Europeans.
12 Delayed integration and
contrast, offer a permanent solution against welfare migration, because each 
immigrating individual is assigned an integration period during which he is only 
partially integrated. It works like a permanent brake on an excessive effect of the 
welfare state as immigration magnet and thus as a measure to protect this welfare state.  
  Secondly, from an economic point of vie
means to optimize the migration process. The people to be permitted to come are 
                                            
  See Husemann (2002).  
12  Furthermore, as previously described, the Hungarian and Polish wages will only amount to one third 
speed of 2% per annum. This, too, will keep up the migration pressure.  
11
of west German wages and less than half of east German wages, even at a maximum convergence 29 
determined according to some rigid rules. Someone must stand at the gate and make a 
selection. It is doubtful whether, after such a selection, it is really those with  the lowest 
subjective and objective migration costs who will come and who may be expected to 
achieve the highest productivity gain by changing their country of residency. Even the 
best bureaucrat cannot hope to match the market’s selection ability. If he could, the 
planned economy would be  as good as the market economy. The selection of 
productive activities from the large quantity of possible activities is the most important 
reason for the superiority of the market economy over the planned economy. To deny 
the market regarding such an important issue as the international migration of labour 
would really be a bad decision. Instead of distributing gifts to those selected by the 
state, it is much better, from an economic point of view, not to distribute any gifts for 
which the state has no money anyway, and to let EU citizens decide for themselves 
whether to migrate or not. Such a liberal solution would also agree much more with the 
spirit of the Treaty of Rome, which demands, among other things, the entirely free 
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